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The Battle of Brazito: Reappraising a
Lost and Forgotten Episode in the
Mexican-American War
NEIL C. MANGUM

Christmas Day 1996 marked the sesquicentennial observance of the Battle
of Brazito, one of only a few pitched battles fought on New Mexico soil
during the Mexican-American War. l Brazito is certainly one of the lesserknown engagements in a war that possesses a reputation for anonymity,
at least in the United States. Each day thousands of motorists hurry
along the busy 1-10 corridor between EI Paso,Texas and Las Cruces,
New Mexico, unaware that the first engagement of the war in New Mexico
was fought in the Rio Grande valley near the community of Mesquite. A
weathered New Mexico State Historical Marker on the north side of the
town of Vado along New Mexico Highway 478 stands as the only reminder of the Battle of Brazito. The current location of the marker suggests that the site is near Vado, a conclusion based largely on the findings
and interpretations of long-time scholars of the battle, George Ruhlen
and Andrew Armstrong. 2 The historical writings of Ruhlen and
Armstrong focused on arguing the battlefield's location but devoted
scant attention to Brazito's military and historical significance. The battlefield, like the battle itself, has become lost, relegated to nothing more
than a passing footnote in history. A closer examination of this conflict,
however, and its significance indicates the engagement played a more
pivotal role in the Mexican-American War than previously considered.
When the Mexican-American War was declared in May 1846, Presi- .
dent James K. Polk focused on achieving two objectives-establishing
the Rio Grande as the boundary between Texas and Mexico, and acquiring the Mexican provinces of New Mexico and California. With Zachary
Neil Mangum is a historian with the National Park Service currently based at SuI
Ross State University, Alpine, Texas. Funds from the American Battlefield Protection Program, National Park Service, Washington, D.C., supported study of the
Brazito Battlefield.
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Taylor's Army of Occupation already entrenched at Fort Brown, Texas,
Polk ordered Colonel Stephen W. Kearny to seize New Mexico and to
protect the interest of United States traders en route to Santa Fe. Polk
envisioned a larger plan than just an overland campaign to conquer New
Mexico. In California, a bubbling caldron of rebellion was brewing. In a
30 May cabinet meeting, Polk and his advisers decided that once New
Mexico fell under the control of the United States, Kearny would proceed to California to establish a civil government there. 3
By the end of June 1846 American troops stood poised at Fort
Leavenworth, Missouri, for the conquest and annexation of New Mexico
and California. Colonel Kearny, a tough thirty-year career army officer
and commander of the army's ehte First Dragoons, assembled a sixteen
hundred-man invasion force comprised of troops from his First Dragoons, artillery, and the First Regiment Missouri Mounted Volunteers. 4
The First Missouri Mounted Volunteers, commanded by Colonel
Alexander Doniphan, constituted the major portion of Kearny's Army of
the West. A graduate of Augusta College in Kentucky, Doniphan established a law practice in Liberty, Missouri, where he became a brigadier
general in the Missouri militia and participated in the expulsion of the
Mormons from Missouri. He served three terms in the Missouri legislature. 5 Doniphan was a towering man for his period. One observer who
saw the victorious soldier in New Orleans after the Missourians completed their campaign described him as standing six foot four inches tall
and weighing between 240 and 260 pounds with fingers nine inches
long and feet of equal proportions. The awed writer went on, "His hair is
a sort of sandy red and sticking out something like porcupine quills and
his men say that he is not afraid of the Devil or the God that made him."6
The First Missouri Volunteers were fun-loving civilians and frontiersmen who did not always observe a strict code of military discipline.
By war's end, however, they had earned the same respect as their commander. Many donned fringed hunting shirts and pantaloons, and the
long campaign bronzed their faces. Most wore full beards that resembled
a bearskin stretched over the face, "with nothing but eye holes cut in
it. "7
By the end of June, Kearny's entire force had marched from Fort
Leavenworth to New Mexico. Following the Santa Fe Trail, his column
reached Santa Fe on 18 August, taking formal possession of New Mexico
the next day. Promoted to brigadier general, Kearny drafted a new constitution for New Mexico known as the Kearny Code which guaranteed
religious freedom, personal property rights, and the annexation of
New Mexico to the United States. s
On 11 October, Kearny postponed the Missourians' departure for
Chihuahua, Mexico. Navajo raiders endangered New Mexico communities and threatened to invalidate Kearny's lofty promise to protect the
citizens of New Mexico from Indian attacks. 9 Kearny ordered Doniphan
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to quell the incursions and restore peace and tranquility in New
Mexico. With his departure now on hold, Doniphan organized a campaign to treat with the Navajos by ordering three columns into the
field in mid-autumn. Consequently, the Navajos agreed to meet at
0)0 del Oso (Bear Spring) near present-day Gallup. Doniphan hurried to Bear Spring where he successfully negotiated a peace treaty
with about five hundred Navajos on 22 November. Doniphan then
concluded peace with the Zunis, a traditional enemy of the Navajo.lo
In mid-December, Doniphan rejoined his regiment on the Rio Grande
near Valverde, where they had been protecting a large merchant caravan. A rumor that more than seven hundred Mexicans were advancing upstream to capture their wagons had stalled the merchants. 11
With the exception of artillery en route from Santa Fe, Doniphan
consolidated his forces. He led his eight hundred and fifty mounted
Missourians, sometimes referred to as Yaeger riflemen, toward Paseo del
Norte (present-day Juarez, Mexico). Doniphan divided his regiment into
three sections and staggered each section's departure two days apart,
commencing on 14 December. 12 Doniphan's Missourians and their seventy-five military wagons escorted over three hundred and seventyfive civilian wagons belonging to traders James Magoffin, James Glasgow,
and othersY To save time, Doniphan took the Jornada del Muerto cutoff
from the Rio Grande. This trackless ninety-five-mile shortcut across
the desert lacked water and suitable forage for livestock. Doniphan reunited the three sections sixty-five miles south of Valverde at the tiny
village of Dona Ana. 14
While encamped at Dona Ana, Captain John Reid led his company
downriver on a scouting mission. On 23 December, Reid's men tangled
with Mexican skirmishers, killing two-the first "true casualties" between the warring nations in New Mexico. ls On the twenty-fourth the
column hit the road again, more or less in close marching order. The
day's march covered fourteen or fifteen miles. Camp talk swirled amid
rumors of a seven hundred-man army of Mexicans marching from EI
Paso. Extra ammunition boxes were brought forward and their contents
distributed. 16
Christmas Day dawned mild, sunny, and bright. Before the sun
emerged over the craggy peaks of the Organ Mountains, Doniphan's
advance guard was already plodding down the Chihuahua Trail. The
command straggled badly this day, however, partly because of wandering livestock from the night before and perhaps because it was Christmas Day. A march of eighteen miles brought the van to an arm of the Rio
Grande, which the locals called Brazito. The Missourians made camp in
an open and level prairie on the east bank of the Rio Grande around 3
P.M. Heavy stands of mesquite and thick chaparral hugged the sandy
terrain to the north and south. To the east, the open ground yielded to a
sandy rise punctuated with small, irregular hillocks. Referring to
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these dome-shaped hills, the Mexicans named the battle "La batalla
de los Temascalitos."17
Because of lax discipline and straggling, no more than four hundred
of Doniphan's men filed into camp. The remaining Missourians and wagons were strung out for several miles. Of those four hundred men in
camp, many were scattered a mile up and down the river searching for
wood to build cooking fires. 18 A knot of officers including Doniphan
were passing the time playing a game of cards with a captured Mexican
horse as the stakes. 19
Doniphan's close approach to Pas eo del Norte, unchecked to this
point, finally forced the Mexicans into action. On 23 December the local
commander, Colonel Gauno Cuylti, had contracted "brain fever" and
returned to Chihuahua City. Under orders from the Governor of Chihuahua, the second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Luis Vidal, directed
Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Ponce de Leon to intercept the Missourians
before they reached Paseo del Norte. 2o Vidal had instructed Ponce de
Leon to engage the enemy (reported to number between three hundred
and four hundred). "until put to flight." After achieving victory, he
should escort the caravan "of Mexicans and foreigners of nationality
friendly to our Republic." Vidal further admonished his subordinate that,
should the strength of the foreigners exceed his numbers, he should
"fall back, with the object of holding the line of defense established at
this camp [near the present-day El Paso smelter], so as to be able to
protect the retreat. "21
Though Ponce de Leon reported on 26 December that his command
barely exceeded five hundred men, the exact size of his force remains a
matter of dispute. 22 Doniphan's Missourians estimated the Mexican army
at between twelve and thirteen hundred men. The discrepancy in Mexican numbers may never be satisfactorily resolved. It seems probable
that the Missourians exaggerated Mexican military strength. A force of
thirteen hundred men should have easily overlapped both flanks of the
Missouri line. (As they did not, the Mexican forces probably numbered
between seven hundred and one thousand.) By the afternoon of Christmas Day, Ponce de Leon's long lines kicked up a column of dust visible
for miles. The cloud on the horizon appeared to Doniphan to be nothing
more than a disturbance created by the wind. Nevertheless, he dispatched
Lieutenant James A. DeCourcey to investigate. The reconnaissance
proved the dust cloud to be no wind gust but a formidable Mexican army
advancing slowly and in good marching order. Doniphan threw down
his cards, uttering something to the effect of "we must stop this game
long enough to whip the Mexicans but remember that I am way ahead in
the score and cannot be beaten, and we will play it out as soon as the
battle is over." With that, bugles blew assembly and the scattered Missourians scurried to find their horses, guns, and company lines. 23
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Figure I: Marcus Ball Edwards, Plan of the Battle Ground of Brazito, c. 1847.
Ink and colored ink wash illustration from Edwards' Journal, Lib/Arch 17B.8.2,
volume I, page 134. Courtesy of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.
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That Ponce de Leon did not attack when first within sight of the
Missourians ranks as a major missed opportunity. The disorganized Missourians were vulnerable to a quick assault, considering the men were
strung out for several miles on the road and in camp. Their horses were
grazing, and very few men, including Doniphan, anticipated an attack.
Instead of unleashing his troops, Ponce de Leon sent a messenger toward Doniphan's rapidly forming skirmish line. The Mexican emissary
bore a black flag emblazoned on one side with double skulls and
crossbones while the opposite side held the lofty inscription, "Libertad
o Muerto." Doniphan sent Lieutenant Colonel David Mitchell and an
interpreter, Thomas Caldwell, to parley with the Mexican messenger.
Between the two lines the adversaries exchanged stiff greetings. The
Mexican officer requested that the American commander accompany him
to Lieutenant Colonel Ponce de Leon. Caldwell responded that if the
Mexicans desired peace, then let the Mexican commander come to
Doniphan. The dialogue disintegrated into mutual threats, and both sides
returned to their respective lines. This episode, however brief, gave
Doniphan valuable minutes to mobilize his defenses. 24
Doniphan's thin skirmish line consisted of a single row and no artillery support. Owing to the sudden approach of the Mexican army, Captain John W. Reid could muster no more than sixteen mounted men, and
everyone else was afoot. The skirmishers dispersed in a wide arc with
both ends thrown back toward the banks of the Rio Grande. Companies
B, C, and E formed the right wing; Companies D, H, and G held the
center, and Companies A and F occupied the left, giving what support
they could to the approaching baggage train. 25
The Veracruz Dragoons formed the extreme right flank of Ponce de
Leon's army. The lone howitzer brought to the battlefield anchored the
center. Squads of seventy-five infantrymen each, probably militiamen
from Paseo del Norte, flanked the small cannon, which was probably a
3-pounder that fired primarily solid shot or pieces of scrap metal. The
Actevo Battalion of Dragoons from Chihuahua and the remaining mi litiamen bolstered the Mexican left flank. 26 One fifteen-year-old
Chihuahuan, Francisco Polanco, was among the militiamen supporting
the center and left. His story is typical of the rank and file that filled the
Mexican army. Polanco had been working the cornfields in his village
near Chihuahua when the Mexican army passed through. Conscripted
into the army, Polanco was brought north to fight an enemy he did not
know. "It was the same all the way up the trail .... The Mexican army
with its pobre voluntarios, without uniforms, just old clothes from the
fields, marched to the rear." Although he was full of fear, Polanco said
he tried to fight wellY
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The Mexican line closed to within four hundred yards before launching a general assault from left to right. Doniphan cautioned his men to
wait until the Mexicans were within one hundred yards to maximize the
shock of their firepower. He urged them to "Remember Okeechobee," a
reference to the 1837 Christmas Day encounter with Seminole Indians in
Florida, where some Missouri troops broke and ran under fire. The Mexican left comprised of the Chihuahua cavalry interspersed with the militiamen advanced toward the right flank commanded by Major William
Gilpin. With difficulty, Gilpin's troops saw the Mexicans. Thick chaparral and a slough provided broken cover for the advancing Mexicans.
Gilpin ordered his men to lie down in the grass. Fooled by the ruse, the
advancing Mexicans were suddenly jolted by "a lurid sheet of fire"
poured into them by the rising Missourians. The riddled Mexicans "fled
howling," reported Gilpin. 28
Just as the Mexican left melted away under Gilpin's withering
counterfire, so did the Mexican center and right. Men of Companies D,
G, and H were ordered to divide themselves into two groups and kneel
down. When the Mexican center approached within one hundred yards,
the first group rose, fired, and then reloaded while the second rose and
fired into the Mexicans ..Private Thomas Edwards, a member of Company
D, wrote of the charging Mexicans: "I can tell you the balls whistled
close about my head. I would dodge my head from one side to the other
until I concluded it was useless and I quit the job as a bad one."29 The
Mexicans recoiled under the attack with the Missourians in pursuit. Soldiers of Company G from Howard County, commanded by Lieutenant
Nicholas B. Wright, captured the diminutive cannon, which was drawn
by a solitary mule. One soldier fighting on the right sarcastically remarked that the cannon seemed "as near of no account as anything
could be:'30 The cannon was relinquished to Lieutenant C.H. Kribben
and a few artillerymen who hoped to direct its fire toward the distant
Mexicans, but they were out of range. 31
The most severe fighting emerged on the Mexican right where the
Veracruz dragoons were positioned. These Mexican regulars, numbering
about five hundred in strength, made a memorable impression on the
Missouri backwoodsmen. The dragoons were dressed in scarlet-trimmed
green coats and blue pantaloons. A tall cap crested with brass and horsehair crowned their uniforms. Each rider carried a sword and lance. Additional weapons may have included an escopeta, which was a sawed-off
Brown-Bess musket, and a muzzle loading pistol, probably of British
manufacture. Many of the dragoons brandished a small, half-black and
half-red pennant that fluttered from the end of an eight-foot lance. 32
Doniphan watched as the dragoons formed to charge against his left
wing under the command of Lieutenant Colonel David Mitchell. Compa-
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nies A and F waited for the lancers to get within range. To check their
advance, Doniphan transferred his own Chihuahua Rangers to the left. 33
Reid's mounted Missourians, numbering less than twenty, also shifted
to the left from their central position.
The charge of the Veracruz Dragoons pounded toward the American
left. Private William H. Richardson of the Chihuahua Rangers remembered the thundering dragoons who poured "volley after volley" into
their ranks until "the sound of bullets over our heads reminded me of a
hail-storm." When Richardson and the other Missourians were finally
permitted to return the fire it sounded like "one loud peal of thunder was
heard from our Missouri rifles."34 The Veracruz charge crumbled under
the massed firepower of the Missourians, and part of the dragoons veered
off farther to their right, as if intending to strike the baggage wagons.
But the baggage and commissary trains, hastily formed into two provisional companies under Quartermaster Sergeant Frank S. Edwards and
Sergeant Hart, proved to be no easy mark. On command from the regimental surgeon, Edwards corralled the twenty wagons on hand. As he
watched the Mexican dragoons recede from the left flank where they had
been repulsed by Reid, Edwards ordered his fifteen to twenty men to
hold their fire until the Mexicans were within ten yards. Edwards continued: "then we each stepped out and gave them our fire. This caused
them again to swerve, and to disappear over a rising ground, whither
they were hotly pursued by our little band of fifteen horsemen." Other
teamsters and traders, including merchant Edward James Glasgow of St.
Louis, gave a good account of themselves in the defense of the wagons. 35
The action on the Mexican right lasted more than twenty minutes
before the Veracruz dragoons were routed and sent fleeing towards Paseo
del Norte by Reid's mounted Missourians. Captain Reid, joined by a few
more mounted soldiers under Captain -William P. Walton, pursued the
Mexicans for nearly four miles and last observed them heading for a gap
in the mountains ten miles away.36
The entire battle lasted no more than thirty minutes. Ponce, wounded
in his left side during the fighting, relinquished command to Captain
Rafael Carajal. Ponce reported eleven killed and seventeen wounded,
the capture of the howitzer, and the general scattering of his command. 3?
Obviously, the Missouri figures on battle casualties differ significantly
from the Mexicans'. Doniphan's official dispatch, written from Chihuahua City on 4 March 1847, claimed forty-three Mexicans died in the
battle with more than 150 wounded, but he probably inflated the figures.
American casualties amounted to seven wounded. 38 The lowest estimate
by an American of Mexican casualties was that by Lieutenant C.H.
Kribben, who placed the Mexican losses at thirty killed, a few wounded,
and eight taken prisoner, six of whom died. 39
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The post-battle scene from the Missourians' perspective took on
the character of a glorious picnic. In their hasty retreat, the Mexicans
abandoned a vast array of guns, souvenirs, and food. The enterprising
Missourians found bottles of wine, loaves of bread, and cakes of cheese,
which supplied a Christmas feast never to be forgotten. 4o
On 26 December, Doniphan's men buried the dead in a common grave
before proceeding to Paseo del Norte, which they reached on the twentyseventh. 41 Rather than finding a large army secure behind defensive
fortifications, a small party of Mexican officials met the volunteers and
announced their city's surrender to the Americans.
Doniphan's victory at Brazito led to the capture of Paseo del Norte
and the occupation of Chihuahua City, three hundred miles south of the
Brazito Battlefield. Doniphan's triumph at Brazito secured southern New
Mexico for the United States. Brazito also contradicted Kearny's lofty
claims of a peaceful conquest of New Mexico. New Mexicans fought the
foreign invasion force. Just three weeks after Brazito, northern New
Mexicans killed Governor Charles Bent and briefly regained control of
their homeland. Colonel Sterling Price needed his entire Second Missouri Volunteer Infantry and additional army regulars to quash the resistance. New Mexicans fought stubbornly at La Canada, Embudo Pass,
Taos Pueblo, and Mora before being subdued. It is highly plausible that,
had Doniphan been defeated or his supplies destroyed at Brazito, Price
would have committed reinforcements to Doniphan thereby weakening
the American grip on northern New Mexico. With a Mexican victory at
Brazito, Price and what might have remained of Doniphan's forces would
have found themselves between the jaws of a pincer, facing enemies to
the north and south. It is quite possible that General Stephen W. Kearny
would have been recalled from his California mission. Still more probable would have been the redirection of General John Wool's column,
which was supposed to unite with Doniphan in Chihuahua City. Wool's
forces were ultimately diverted from Chihuahua and used to thwart General Santa Ana's army at the battle of Buena Vista.
The end result of a United States failure at Brazito would have dictated prolonging the war. Had the Mexican army retained possession of
lower New Mexico through the cessation of hostilities, the lower half of
New Mexico would not have been annexed by the United States under
the terms of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. There can be little
argument that Colonel Doniphan's victory at Brazito gave the United
States its legal claim to New Mexico. A battle that substantially changed
the borders of nations should hold a more prominent place in American
history. So much for a small but significant thirty-minute battle.
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